Condorcet meets Bentham
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Condorcet meets Bentham
zbMATH Open document ID: 1319.91073
author: Marcus Pivato
published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics
publication date: 2015-08-21T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 6474590
zbMATH Keywords: utilitarian
zbMATH Keywords: Condorcet winner
zbMATH Keywords: spatial voting
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jmateco.2015.04.006
OpenAlex ID: W264156656
Wikidata QID: Q56081054
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JMATECO.2015.04.006
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6474590