Flexibility vs. protection from an unrepresentative legislative majority
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Flexibility vs. protection from an unrepresentative legislative majority
zbMATH Open document ID: 1347.91122
author: Brett Graham
author: Dan Bernhardt
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2015-09-15T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: WRAP Congress May 4 2015 (00000002).pdf
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91F10
zbMATH DE Number: 6482167
zbMATH Keywords: supermajority
zbMATH Keywords: agenda setting
zbMATH Keywords: legislative bargaining
zbMATH Keywords: delegated decision making
zbMATH Keywords: voting rules
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2124717068
cites work: Endogenous Political Institutions
cites work: Choosing How to Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules and Constitutions
cites work: Competence and Ideology
cites work: The Coalitional Nash Bargaining Solution
cites work: A Newton collocation method for solving dynamic bargaining games
cites work: Dynamic legislative policy making
cites work: Voting on Majority Rules
cites work: Q4872499
cites work: Q4330513
DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2015.07.004
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6482167