Focal points and bargaining in housing markets
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Focal points and bargaining in housing markets
zbMATH Open document ID: 1347.91161
author: Devin G. Pope
author: Jaren C. Pope
author: Justin R. Sydnor
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2015-09-15T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
zbMATH DE Number: 6482168
zbMATH Keywords: focal points
zbMATH Keywords: bargaining
zbMATH Keywords: housing prices
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2015.07.002
OpenAlex ID: W1074932569
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2015.07.002
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6482168