Mixed equilibria in Tullock contests
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Mixed equilibria in Tullock contests
zbMATH Open document ID: 1367.91013
author: Christian Ewerhart
published in: Economic Theory
publication date: 2015-09-22T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 6484416
zbMATH Keywords: Tullock contest
zbMATH Keywords: mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: analytical functions
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00199-014-0835-x
OpenAlex ID: W3125494907
Wikidata QID: Q59429712
cites work: A simple extension of the Dasgupta-Maskin existence theorem for discontinuous games with an application to the theory of rent-seeking
cites work: The all-pay auction with complete information
cites work: Difference-form contests and the robustness of all-pay auctions
cites work: The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, I: Theory
cites work: Contests with small noise and the robustness of the all-pay auction
cites work: Effort maximization in asymmetric contest games with heterogeneous contestants
cites work: Multi-battle contests
DOI: 10.1007/S00199-014-0835-X
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6484416