Anonymous, neutral, and strategy-proof rules on the Condorcet domain
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Anonymous, neutral, and strategy-proof rules on the Condorcet domain
zbMATH Open document ID: 1321.91034
author: Donald E. Campbell
author: Jerry S. Kelly
published in: Economics Letters
publication date: 2015-09-29T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 6486756
zbMATH Keywords: social choice rules
zbMATH Keywords: Condorcet
zbMATH Keywords: anonymity
zbMATH Keywords: neutrality
zbMATH Keywords: strategy-proofness
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.econlet.2015.01.009
OpenAlex ID: W2094228445
cites work: A strategy-proofness characterization of majority rule
cites work: Parity dependence of a majority rule characterization on the Condorcet domain
DOI: 10.1016/J.ECONLET.2015.01.009
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6486756