On repeated games with imperfect public monitoring: from discrete to continuous time
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: On repeated games with imperfect public monitoring: from discrete to continuous time
zbMATH Open document ID: 1354.91018
author: Jan-Henrik Steg
author: Mathias Staudigl
published in: Journal of Dynamics and Games
publication date: 2017-01-10T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A15
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A50
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 60G57
zbMATH DE Number: 6673083
zbMATH Keywords: continuous-time game theory
zbMATH Keywords: perfect-public equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: weak convergence
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: jdg.2017001
OpenAlex ID: W3124166736
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DOI: 10.3934/JDG.2017001
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6673083