Efficiency of flexible budgetary institutions
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Efficiency of flexible budgetary institutions
zbMATH Open document ID: 1400.91182
author: Yong-Cai Geng
author: Sumit K. Garg
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2017-01-11T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: w22457.pdf
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B18
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B32
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91F10
zbMATH DE Number: 6673626
zbMATH Keywords: budget negotiations
zbMATH Keywords: mandatory spending
zbMATH Keywords: discretionary spending
zbMATH Keywords: flexibility
zbMATH Keywords: endogenous status quo
zbMATH Keywords: sunset provision
zbMATH Keywords: dynamic efficiency
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W3124801992
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2016.10.007
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6673626