Bayesian persuasion by a privately informed sender
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Bayesian persuasion by a privately informed sender
zbMATH Open document ID: 1400.91106
author: Jonas Hedlund
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2017-01-11T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A28
zbMATH DE Number: 6673629
zbMATH Keywords: Bayesian persuasion
zbMATH Keywords: signaling
zbMATH Keywords: information transmission
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jet.2016.11.003
OpenAlex ID: W2549701036
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2016.11.003
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6673629