Analysis of information feedback and selfconfirming equilibrium
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Analysis of information feedback and selfconfirming equilibrium
zbMATH Open document ID: 1368.91025
published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics
publication date: 2017-01-16T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: RePEc:igi:igierp:459
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A18
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A26
zbMATH DE Number: 6675068
zbMATH Keywords: selfconfirming equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: conjectural equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: information feedback
zbMATH Keywords: ambiguity aversion
zbMATH Keywords: partially specified probabilities
author: Pierpaolo Battigalli
author: Simone Cerreia-Vioglio
author: Fabio Maccheroni
author: Massimo Marinacci
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2227939299
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JMATECO.2016.07.002
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6675068