Managerial Delegation, Law Enforcement, and Aggregate Productivity
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Managerial Delegation, Law Enforcement, and Aggregate Productivity
zbMATH Open document ID: 1504.91151
author: Jan Grobovšek
publication date: 2022-11-11T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B50
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B62
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B39
zbMATH DE Number: 7614892
zbMATH Keywords: growth and development
zbMATH Keywords: TFP
zbMATH Keywords: productivity
zbMATH Keywords: firm size
zbMATH Keywords: misallocation
zbMATH Keywords: management
zbMATH Keywords: delegation
zbMATH Keywords: law enforcement
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: rdaa025
OpenAlex ID: W2400959961
DOI: 10.1093/RESTUD/RDAA025
published in: Review of Economic Studies
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7614892