Coordination-free equilibria in cheap talk games
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Coordination-free equilibria in cheap talk games
zbMATH Open document ID: 1400.91111
author: Shih En Lu
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2017-02-10T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: http://summit.sfu.ca/item/18388
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A28
zbMATH DE Number: 6683468
zbMATH Keywords: cheap talk
zbMATH Keywords: strategic communication
zbMATH Keywords: robustness
zbMATH Keywords: incomplete information
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2182464862
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2016.12.004
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6683468