Instability of belief-free equilibria
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Instability of belief-free equilibria
zbMATH Open document ID: 1400.91048
author: Yuval Heller
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2017-02-10T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: MPRA paper 75990.pdf
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B18
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A28
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A05
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
zbMATH DE Number: 6683472
zbMATH Keywords: belief-free equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: evolutionary stability
zbMATH Keywords: private monitoring
zbMATH Keywords: repeated prisoner's dilemma
zbMATH Keywords: communication
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W3123213776
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2017.01.001
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6683472