Power in voting rules with abstention: an axiomatization of a two components power index
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Power in voting rules with abstention: an axiomatization of a two components power index
zbMATH Open document ID: 1406.91106
author: Josep Freixas
author: Roberto Lucchetti
published in: Annals of Operations Research
publication date: 2017-03-03T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2117/84162
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B06
zbMATH DE Number: 6691220
zbMATH Keywords: decision making process
zbMATH Keywords: voting systems in democratic organizations
zbMATH Keywords: abstention
zbMATH Keywords: power
zbMATH Keywords: axioms
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2263481943
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DOI: 10.1007/S10479-016-2124-5
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6691220