Revenue and reserve prices in a probabilistic single item auction
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Revenue and reserve prices in a probabilistic single item auction
zbMATH Open document ID: 1358.91055
author: Noga Alon
author: Moran Feldman
author: Moshe Tennenholtz
published in: Algorithmica
publication date: 2017-03-06T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 6691974
zbMATH Keywords: reserve prices
zbMATH Keywords: second price auctions
zbMATH Keywords: single item auctions
zbMATH Keywords: revenue maximization
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00453-015-0055-1
OpenAlex ID: W2284693485
cites work: Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
cites work: Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
cites work: Extracting the Surplus in the Common-Value Auction
cites work: Optimal Auction Design
cites work: Bundling Decisions by a Multiproduct Monopolist with Incomplete Information
DOI: 10.1007/S00453-015-0055-1
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6691974