Asymmetric employer information, promotions, and the wage policy of firms
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Asymmetric employer information, promotions, and the wage policy of firms
zbMATH Open document ID: 1394.91257
author: Simon Dato
author: Andreas Grunewald
author: Matthias Kräkel
author: Daniel Müller
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2017-03-16T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B38
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B40
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A90
zbMATH DE Number: 6695290
zbMATH Keywords: invisibility hypothesis
zbMATH Keywords: poaching
zbMATH Keywords: promotion-as-signal hypothesis
describes a project that uses: Z-Tree
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2016.09.013
OpenAlex ID: W2529999154
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cites work: Promotion tournaments in market equilibrium
cites work: Corporate tournaments, human capital acquisition, and the firm size-wage relation
DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2016.09.013
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6695290