A simple market-like allocation mechanism for public goods
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: A simple market-like allocation mechanism for public goods
zbMATH Open document ID: 1393.91067
author: Yong-Cai Geng
author: Sumit K. Garg
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2017-04-20T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B18
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B32
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B50
zbMATH DE Number: 6706385
zbMATH Keywords: allocation mechanisms
zbMATH Keywords: public goods
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2016.02.002
OpenAlex ID: W2290108234
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2016.02.002
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6706385