Implementation under ambiguity
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Implementation under ambiguity
zbMATH Open document ID: 1393.91111
author: Luciano I. de Castro
author: Nicholas C. Yannelis
author: Zhi-Wei Liu
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2017-04-20T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B44
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 6706386
zbMATH Keywords: maximin preferences
zbMATH Keywords: maximin efficient allocations
zbMATH Keywords: maximin equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: implementation
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2015.10.010
OpenAlex ID: W2210921810
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2015.10.010
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6706386