Contract design and stability in many-to-many matching
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Contract design and stability in many-to-many matching
zbMATH Open document ID: 1393.91119
author: John William Hatfield
author: Scott Duke Kominers
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2017-04-20T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B68
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B40
zbMATH DE Number: 6706390
zbMATH Keywords: many-to-many matching
zbMATH Keywords: stability
zbMATH Keywords: substitutes
zbMATH Keywords: contract design
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2016.01.002
OpenAlex ID: W2182266207
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2016.01.002
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6706390