Balancing the power to appoint officers
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Balancing the power to appoint officers
zbMATH Open document ID: 1393.91053
author: Danilo Coelho
author: Salvador Barberà
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2017-04-20T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: 696.pdf
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 6706396
zbMATH Keywords: voting rules
zbMATH Keywords: constitutional design
zbMATH Keywords: strong Nash equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: rule of \(k\) names
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2118937432
cites work: Q4003461
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2015.10.005
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6706396