Generalized Groves-Ledyard mechanisms
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Generalized Groves-Ledyard mechanisms
zbMATH Open document ID: 1393.91065
author: Paul J. Healy
author: Ritesh Jain
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2017-04-20T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B18
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B50
zbMATH DE Number: 6706397
zbMATH Keywords: Nash implementation
zbMATH Keywords: public goods
zbMATH Keywords: demand revelation
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2016.01.005
OpenAlex ID: W2268335551
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2016.01.005
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6706397