Fixation probabilities of strategies for bimatrix games in finite populations
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Fixation probabilities of strategies for bimatrix games in finite populations
zbMATH Open document ID: 1391.91040
author: Takuya Sekiguchi
author: Hisashi Ohtsuki
published in: Dynamic Games and Applications
publication date: 2017-04-21T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A22
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A15
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A05
zbMATH DE Number: 6706865
zbMATH Keywords: bimatrix games
zbMATH Keywords: equilibrium selection
zbMATH Keywords: finite population
zbMATH Keywords: fixation probability
zbMATH Keywords: stability
zbMATH Keywords: stochastic evolution
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s13235-015-0170-2
OpenAlex ID: W1732707482
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DOI: 10.1007/S13235-015-0170-2
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6706865