Meet the lemons: an experiment on how cheap-talk overcomes adverse selection in decentralized markets
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Meet the lemons: an experiment on how cheap-talk overcomes adverse selection in decentralized markets
zbMATH Open document ID: 1409.91078
author: Simon Siegenthaler
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2017-04-21T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A90
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B44
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A28
zbMATH DE Number: 6706916
zbMATH Keywords: adverse selection
zbMATH Keywords: cheap-talk
zbMATH Keywords: decentralized markets
zbMATH Keywords: experiment
zbMATH Keywords: frictions
zbMATH Keywords: information transmission
zbMATH Keywords: market for lemons
describes a project that uses: Z-Tree
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2016.11.001
OpenAlex ID: W3122704937
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2016.11.001
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6706916