Unanimous rules in the laboratory
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Unanimous rules in the laboratory
zbMATH Open document ID: 1409.91069
author: Laurent Bouton
author: Aniol Llorente-Saguer
author: Frédéric Malherbe
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2017-04-21T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: w21943.pdf
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A90
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
zbMATH DE Number: 6706918
zbMATH Keywords: unanimity rule
zbMATH Keywords: veto power
zbMATH Keywords: constructive abstention
zbMATH Keywords: information aggregation
zbMATH Keywords: laboratory experiments
zbMATH Keywords: framing
describes a project that uses: ORSEE
describes a project that uses: Z-Tree
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2253683008
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2016.12.001
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6706918