Voting as communicating: mandates, multiple candidates, and the signaling voter's curse
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Voting as communicating: mandates, multiple candidates, and the signaling voter's curse
zbMATH Open document ID: 1409.91106
author: Joseph McMurray
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2017-04-21T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A28
zbMATH DE Number: 6706919
zbMATH Keywords: voting
zbMATH Keywords: elections
zbMATH Keywords: mandates
zbMATH Keywords: ideology
zbMATH Keywords: information aggregation
zbMATH Keywords: polarization
zbMATH Keywords: parties
zbMATH Keywords: jury theorem
zbMATH Keywords: public opinion
zbMATH Keywords: swing voter's curse
zbMATH Keywords: turnout
zbMATH Keywords: abstention
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2016.12.005
OpenAlex ID: W2565394785
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2016.12.005
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6706919