Voting with endogenous information acquisition: experimental evidence
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Voting with endogenous information acquisition: experimental evidence
zbMATH Open document ID: 1409.91068
author: Sourav Bhattacharya
author: John Duffy
author: Sun Kim
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2017-04-21T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A90
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
zbMATH DE Number: 6706927
zbMATH Keywords: voting
zbMATH Keywords: information acquisition
zbMATH Keywords: free-riding
zbMATH Keywords: Condorcet jury model
zbMATH Keywords: information aggregation
zbMATH Keywords: experimental economics
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2017.01.005
OpenAlex ID: W2575083990
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2017.01.005
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6706927