Irrationality and ambiguity in extensive games
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Irrationality and ambiguity in extensive games
zbMATH Open document ID: 1409.91031
author: Ronald Stauber
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2017-04-21T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A18
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A05
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A06
zbMATH DE Number: 6706931
zbMATH Keywords: extensive games
zbMATH Keywords: ambiguity
zbMATH Keywords: maxmin
zbMATH Keywords: backward induction
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2017.01.010
OpenAlex ID: W2586229362
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2017.01.010
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6706931