Real-time tacit bargaining, payoff focality, and coordination complexity: experimental evidence
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Real-time tacit bargaining, payoff focality, and coordination complexity: experimental evidence
zbMATH Open document ID: 1409.91077
author: Wolfgang J. Luhan
author: Anders U. Poulsen
author: Michael W. M. Roos
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2017-04-21T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: Accepted manuscript YGAME2659.pdf
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A90
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A05
zbMATH DE Number: 6706947
zbMATH Keywords: bargaining
zbMATH Keywords: payoff focality
zbMATH Keywords: coordination complexity
describes a project that uses: ORSEE
describes a project that uses: Z-Tree
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2601611602
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2017.02.016
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6706947