Stable partitions for games with non-transferable utility and externalities
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Stable partitions for games with non-transferable utility and externalities
zbMATH Open document ID: 1388.91027
author: Dominik Karos
published in: International Journal of Game Theory
publication date: 2017-04-27T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
zbMATH DE Number: 6708434
zbMATH Keywords: games with non-transferable utility in partition function form
zbMATH Keywords: bargaining with claims
zbMATH Keywords: ordinal games
zbMATH Keywords: core stable partitions
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00182-015-0487-5
OpenAlex ID: W2253384167
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DOI: 10.1007/S00182-015-0487-5
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6708434