A natural mechanism to choose the deserving winner when the jury is made up of all contestants
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: A natural mechanism to choose the deserving winner when the jury is made up of all contestants
zbMATH Open document ID: 1210.91030
author: Pablo Amorós
published in: Economics Letters
publication date: 2011-04-29T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: METCwp2010-7.pdf
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 5882478
zbMATH Keywords: mechanism design
zbMATH Keywords: contest
zbMATH Keywords: subgame perfect equilibrium
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W1984982463
cites work: Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition
cites work: Eliciting socially optimal rankings from unfair jurors
cites work: The scholarship assignment problem
cites work: Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
cites work: Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
cites work: Role of honesty in full implementation
cites work: Subgame Perfect Implementation
cites work: The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules
DOI: 10.1016/J.ECONLET.2010.11.038
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5882478