Demand commitments in majority bargaining or how formateurs get their way
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Demand commitments in majority bargaining or how formateurs get their way
zbMATH Open document ID: 1211.91131
author: Yves Breitmoser
published in: International Journal of Game Theory
publication date: 2011-05-05T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 5884710
zbMATH Keywords: demand bargaining
zbMATH Keywords: majority decisions
zbMATH Keywords: non-cooperative
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00182-008-0144-3
OpenAlex ID: W2045121063
cites work: Elections, governments, and parliaments in proportional representation systems
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cites work: Behavioral Identification in Coalitional Bargaining: An Experimental Analysis of Demand Bargaining and Alternating Offers
cites work: Coalition and party formation in a legislative voting game
cites work: Bargaining with commitments
cites work: The demand commitment bargaining and snowballing cooperation
DOI: 10.1007/S00182-008-0144-3
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5884710