Credible deviations from signaling equilibria
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Credible deviations from signaling equilibria
zbMATH Open document ID: 1211.91074
author: Péter Eső
author: James Schummer
published in: International Journal of Game Theory
publication date: 2011-05-05T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A28
zbMATH DE Number: 5884723
zbMATH Keywords: signaling games
zbMATH Keywords: sender-receiver
zbMATH Keywords: robust equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: refinements
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2120779234
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DOI: 10.1007/S00182-009-0161-X
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5884723