Coalition-proof equilibria in a voluntary participation game
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Coalition-proof equilibria in a voluntary participation game
zbMATH Open document ID: 1211.91021
author: Ryusuke Shinohara
published in: International Journal of Game Theory
publication date: 2011-05-05T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: Coalition-proof equilibria voluntary participation game.pdf
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
zbMATH DE Number: 5884776
zbMATH Keywords: participation game
zbMATH Keywords: coalition-proof equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: dominance relation
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W1971456882
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DOI: 10.1007/S00182-010-0244-8
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5884776