Dynamic coalitional equilibrium
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Dynamic coalitional equilibrium
zbMATH Open document ID: 1282.91037
author: Hannu Vartiainen
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2011-05-02T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
zbMATH DE Number: 5882927
zbMATH Keywords: one-deviation principle
zbMATH Keywords: coalition formation
zbMATH Keywords: history dependence
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jet.2010.10.006
OpenAlex ID: W2134133842
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2010.10.006
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5882927