Finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring
zbMATH Open document ID: 1211.91060
author: Pauline Contou-Carrère
author: Tristan Tomala
published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics
publication date: 2011-05-10T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: 10073.pdf
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A06
zbMATH DE Number: 5886232
zbMATH Keywords: finitely repeated games
zbMATH Keywords: semi-standard monitoring
zbMATH Keywords: folk theorem
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2170266066
cites work: Q4296856
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JMATECO.2010.10.005
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5886232