Core of the assignment game via fixed point methods
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Core of the assignment game via fixed point methods
zbMATH Open document ID: 1211.91076
author: Serkan Kucuksenel
published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics
publication date: 2011-05-10T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A40
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B68
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 46N10
zbMATH DE Number: 5886241
zbMATH Keywords: two-sided matching
zbMATH Keywords: assignment game
zbMATH Keywords: stability
zbMATH Keywords: core
zbMATH Keywords: lattice structure
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jmateco.2011.01.003
OpenAlex ID: W2055501687
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JMATECO.2011.01.003
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5886241