Asymmetry and revenue in first-price auctions
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Asymmetry and revenue in first-price auctions
zbMATH Open document ID: 1211.91132
published in: Economics Letters
publication date: 2011-05-10T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 5886267
zbMATH Keywords: asymmetry
zbMATH Keywords: revenue effect
zbMATH Keywords: first-price auctions
zbMATH Keywords: private value
author: Harrison H. C. Cheng
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.econlet.2010.12.004
OpenAlex ID: W1974665451
cites work: Investment Incentives in Procurement Auctions
cites work: The effect of bidders' asymmetries on expected revenue in auctions
cites work: First-price auctions when the ranking of valuations is common knowledge
cites work: Continuity of the first price auction Nash equilibrium correspondence.
cites work: Numerical analysis of asymmetric first price auctions
cites work: Entry and R{\&}D in procurement contracting
DOI: 10.1016/J.ECONLET.2010.12.004
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5886267