The chairman's paradox revisited
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: The chairman's paradox revisited
zbMATH Open document ID: 1211.91099
published in: Social Choice and Welfare
publication date: 2011-05-11T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
zbMATH DE Number: 5886859
author: Matthew Braham
author: Frank Daniel Steffen
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00355-006-0163-6
OpenAlex ID: W2159442761
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DOI: 10.1007/S00355-006-0163-6
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5886859