Collusion, agglomeration, and heterogeneity of firms
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Collusion, agglomeration, and heterogeneity of firms
zbMATH Open document ID: 1236.91109
author: Toshihiro Matsumura
author: Noriaki Matsushima
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2011-05-16T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: 2009 05.pdf
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B72
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 5888233
zbMATH Keywords: cost asymmetry
zbMATH Keywords: spatial agglomeration
zbMATH Keywords: collusion
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2170610265
cites work: Cournot Competition Yields Spatial Agglomeration
cites work: On Hotelling's "Stability in Competition"
cites work: The Principle of Minimum Differentiation Holds under Sufficient Heterogeneity
cites work: Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons
cites work: Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem
cites work: Nonminimal product differentiation as a bargaining outcome.
DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2010.08.003
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5888233