A theory of income taxation where politicians focus upon core and swing voters
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: A theory of income taxation where politicians focus upon core and swing voters
zbMATH Open document ID: 1232.91602
author: John E. Roemer
published in: Social Choice and Welfare
publication date: 2011-05-20T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91F10
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B64
zbMATH DE Number: 5898375
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00355-010-0514-1
OpenAlex ID: W2098166286
cites work: An Economic Model of Representative Democracy
cites work: Voting over income taxation
cites work: Ideology, Tactics, and Efficiency in Redistributive Politics
cites work: A model of political parties
cites work: A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates
cites work: The Democratic Political Economy of Progressive Income Taxation
DOI: 10.1007/S00355-010-0514-1
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5898375