Revenue monotonicity in deterministic, dominant-strategy combinatorial auctions
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Revenue monotonicity in deterministic, dominant-strategy combinatorial auctions
zbMATH Open document ID: 1214.91047
author: Baharak Rastegari
author: Anne Condon
author: Kevin Leyton-Brown
published in: Artificial Intelligence
publication date: 2011-06-17T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: 1 s2.0 S0004370210001438 main.pdf
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A46
zbMATH DE Number: 5909450
zbMATH Keywords: mechanism design
zbMATH Keywords: combinatorial auctions
zbMATH Keywords: revenue
Wikidata QID: Q60521647
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2142852830
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DBLP publication ID: journals/ai/RastegariCL11
DOI: 10.1016/J.ARTINT.2010.08.005
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5909450