Crowding out and crowding in: when does redistribution improve risk-sharing in limited commitment economies?
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Crowding out and crowding in: when does redistribution improve risk-sharing in limited commitment economies?
zbMATH Open document ID: 1246.91058
author: Tobias Broer
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2011-06-28T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B30
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B64
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91G80
zbMATH DE Number: 5914040
zbMATH Keywords: insurance
zbMATH Keywords: default
zbMATH Keywords: limited enforcement
zbMATH Keywords: redistribution
zbMATH Keywords: fiscal policy
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jet.2011.03.017
OpenAlex ID: W2033063561
cites work: Efficiency, Equilibrium, and Asset Pricing with Risk of Default
cites work: Endogenous trading constraints with incomplete asset markets
cites work: Debt Constrained Asset Markets
cites work: Public versus private risk sharing
cites work: Does Income Inequality Lead to Consumption Inequality? Evidence and Theory1
DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2011.03.017
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5914040