On the elimination of dominated strategies in stochastic models of evolution with large populations
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: On the elimination of dominated strategies in stochastic models of evolution with large populations
zbMATH Open document ID: 1217.91017
author: Christoph Kuzmics
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2011-07-08T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A22
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A06
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A15
zbMATH DE Number: 5919001
zbMATH Keywords: learning
zbMATH Keywords: experimentation
zbMATH Keywords: \(S^{\infty }W\)-procedure
zbMATH Keywords: weak dominance
zbMATH Keywords: iterated strict dominance
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W3123610452
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2010.10.002
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5919001