Let the experts decide? Asymmetric information, abstention, and coordination in standing committees
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Let the experts decide? Asymmetric information, abstention, and coordination in standing committees
zbMATH Open document ID: 1217.91034
author: Rebecca B. Morton
author: Jean-Robert Tyran
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2011-07-08T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A90
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
zbMATH DE Number: 5919003
zbMATH Keywords: information aggregation
zbMATH Keywords: voting
zbMATH Keywords: asymmetric information
zbMATH Keywords: swing voter's curse
describes a project that uses: Z-Tree
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2010.09.007
OpenAlex ID: W3121810695
cites work: The Swing Voter's Curse in the Laboratory
cites work: Repetition and signalling: Experimental evidence from games with efficient equilibria
cites work: When and why? A critical survey on coordination failure in the laboratory
cites work: Informative voting and condorcet jury theorems with a continuum of types
DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2010.09.007
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5919003