Incentives in core-selecting auctions with single-minded bidders
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Incentives in core-selecting auctions with single-minded bidders
zbMATH Open document ID: 1217.91078
author: Ryuji Sano
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2011-07-08T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 5919012
zbMATH Keywords: package auction
zbMATH Keywords: core-selecting auction
zbMATH Keywords: ascending proxy auction
zbMATH Keywords: single-minded bidder
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2010.11.003
OpenAlex ID: W2017295041
cites work: The package assignment model.
cites work: Core-selecting package auctions
cites work: Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
cites work: Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations
DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2010.11.003
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5919012