Collectively rational voting rules for simple preferences
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Collectively rational voting rules for simple preferences
zbMATH Open document ID: 1222.91016
author: Biung-Ghi Ju
published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics
publication date: 2011-07-27T00:00:00Z
review text: This paper discusses transitivity of social preference relations and weaker versions of it. Two kinds of restricted domains of individual preferences are considered. The first is characterized by all preferences having at most two indifference classes. The other is characterized by any set of three alternatives being partitioned into two non-empty subsets such that alternatives in one set are strictly preferred to alternatives in the other set. It is proved that, for fixed such domains, among the voting rules satisfying monotonicity, anonymity and neutrality, majority voting is the unique satisfying transitivity, although other voting rules satisfy acyclicity.
reviewed by: Annibal Parracho Sant'Anna
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B08
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 5933148
zbMATH Keywords: transitivity
zbMATH Keywords: quasi-transitivity
zbMATH Keywords: acyclicity
zbMATH Keywords: majority rule
zbMATH Keywords: voting rule
zbMATH Keywords: collective rationality
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jmateco.2011.01.005
OpenAlex ID: W2016776262
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JMATECO.2011.01.005
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5933148