Information aggregation in multicandidate elections under plurality rule and runoff voting
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Information aggregation in multicandidate elections under plurality rule and runoff voting
zbMATH Open document ID: 1229.91111
author: Patrick Hummel
published in: Mathematical Social Sciences
publication date: 2011-08-04T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
zbMATH DE Number: 5935942
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.mathsocsci.2011.03.003
OpenAlex ID: W2064826385
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DOI: 10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2011.03.003
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5935942