Voting cycles and the structure of individual preferences
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Voting cycles and the structure of individual preferences
zbMATH Open document ID: 0625.90005
DOI: 10.1007/BF00433943
published in: Social Choice and Welfare
publication date: 1987-01-01T00:00:00Z
review text: Empirical studies have shown that cyclical preferences are infrequent, but they have been less clear about why. Using ``thermometer'' ratings from nationally-representative samples of the U.S., we examine preferences for presidential candidates in order to determine what it is about them that leads to few cycles. Single-peaked preferences as usually construed (meaning that all of a set of preferences satisfy single- peakedness criteria) are, of course, rare. Yet we find a high degree of unidimensionality in the sense that for any given set of preferences, a relatively high proportion of the preference orders are consistent with single-peakedness. We also find that the highest amounts of unidimensionality often do not occur along partisan of left/right lines. Strong feelings for or against candidates, often not derived from an issue base, form the basis for the dimensionality discovered.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B08
zbMATH DE Number: 4016543
zbMATH Keywords: cyclical preferences
zbMATH Keywords: Single-peaked preferences
zbMATH Keywords: unidimensionality
Wikidata QID: Q56067992
author: Richard G. Niemi
author: John R. Wright
MaRDI profile type: Publication
cites work: Q3266133
cites work: Condorcet's paradox
cites work: Equilibrium in spatial voting: The median voter result is an artifact
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4016543