Voting cycles and the structure of individual preferences
Empirical studies have shown that cyclical preferences are infrequent, but they have been less clear about why. Using ``thermometer'' ratings from nationally-representative samples of the U.S., we examine preferences for presidential candidates in order to determine what it is about them that leads to few cycles. Single-peaked preferences as usually construed (meaning that all of a set of preferences satisfy single- peakedness criteria) are, of course, rare. Yet we find a high degree of unidimensionality in the sense that for any given set of preferences, a relatively high proportion of the preference orders are consistent with single-peakedness. We also find that the highest amounts of unidimensionality often do not occur along partisan of left/right lines. Strong feelings for or against candidates, often not derived from an issue base, form the basis for the dimensionality discovered.
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4016543