Potential games with continuous player sets
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Potential games with continuous player sets
zbMATH Open document ID: 0990.91005
author: William H. Sandholm
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2002-08-19T00:00:00Z
review text: The author considers potential games with continuous player sets, which include random matching games with common payoffs and congestion games. By use of the Kuhn-Tucker condition, Nash equilibria of the potential games are characterized. It is derived that under positive correlation solution trajectories starting from each initial condition have to converge to rest points. If noncomplacency holds as well, all of these limit points have to be Nash equilibria.
reviewed by: Wu Liangsen
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A07
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A22
zbMATH DE Number: 1618885
zbMATH Keywords: random matching games
zbMATH Keywords: congestion games
zbMATH Keywords: Kuhn-Tucker condition
zbMATH Keywords: Nash equilibria
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: jeth.2000.2696
OpenAlex ID: W2115483886
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DOI: 10.1006/JETH.2000.2696
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1618885