On the predictive efficiency of the core solution in side-payment games
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: On the predictive efficiency of the core solution in side-payment games
zbMATH Open document ID: 0524.90099
DOI: 10.1007/BF00133460
author: H. Andrew Michener
author: Kathryn Potter
author: Melvin M. Sakurai
published in: Theory and Decision
publication date: 1983-01-01T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
zbMATH DE Number: 3831715
zbMATH Keywords: side-payment games
zbMATH Keywords: predictive accuracy
zbMATH Keywords: core
zbMATH Keywords: Shapley value
zbMATH Keywords: disruption nucleolus
zbMATH Keywords: 2-center
zbMATH Keywords: equality solution
zbMATH Keywords: goodness-of-fit measure
MaRDI profile type: Publication
cites work: The Core of a Cooperative Game Without Side Payments
cites work: Sharing the Gains from Regional Cooperation: A Game Theoretic Application to Planning Investment in Electric Power
cites work: Q3049699
cites work: On the Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
cites work: The propensity to disrupt and the disruption nucleolus of a characteristic function game
cites work: Geometric Properties of the Kernel, Nucleolus, and Related Solution Concepts
cites work: Q3690618
cites work: On the comparative accuracy of lexicographical solutions in cooperative games
cites work: Theory of games and economic behavior.
cites work: The Shapley Value as a von Neumann-Morgenstern Utility
cites work: The Core of an N Person Game
cites work: The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
cites work: Q5817870
cites work: Quasi-Cores in a Monetary Economy with Nonconvex Preferences
cites work: The Geometry of Solution Concepts for N-Person Cooperative Games
cites work: Cores in noncooperative games
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3831715