Maintaining equilibria during exploration in sponsored search auctions
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Maintaining equilibria during exploration in sponsored search auctions
zbMATH Open document ID: 1198.68095
author: John Langford
author: Lihong Li
author: Yevgeniy Vorobeychik
author: Jennifer Wortman
published in: Algorithmica
publication date: 2010-11-08T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 68M11
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 68T05
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 90B60
zbMATH DE Number: 5813800
zbMATH Keywords: sponsored search auctions
zbMATH Keywords: equilibrium analysis
zbMATH Keywords: exploration
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2108808125
cites work: Forward looking Nash equilibrium for keyword auction
cites work: An incentive-compatible multi-armed bandit mechanism
cites work: Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error
cites work: Probability Inequalities for Sums of Bounded Random Variables
DOI: 10.1007/S00453-009-9318-Z
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5813800